Editors’ note: This is a transcript version of the episode of Alpha Trader that we published last week. We hope you enjoy.
Aaron Task: Welcome to Alpha Trader. Our guest today is Mark Dow. He’s the author of the Behavioral Macro blog and like twitter feed at Behavioral Macro, which I highly recommend if you’re into trading and macro analysis. He’s a former hedge fund manager, former buy side mutual fund manager. He’s also a former staff economist at the IMF and Treasury, very interesting path leading to where he is today, which we’ll talk about in a bit. Mark, welcome to Alpha Trader.
Mark Dow: Thanks. Thanks for having me here.
Stephen Alpher: Welcome Mark.
AT: First got to get to your thoughts on the jobs numbers that came out Friday morning, way better than expected, I heard blow out. All kinds of great accolades about the strength of the U.S. economy most jobs since January. The three months average, now over 205,000 and even smoothing out for the strike from GM, so very solid jobs numbers. What, if anything, does this mean for the Fed as they meet December 10, and 11th?
MD: I don’t think it means much of anything, really. I mean, the job growth has been solid for some time. It’s been — I don’t know how many months of solid job growth really probably since, I don’t know, say 10 years, but probably eight. And it continues to grow at a rate faster than the growth of the labor force, which is an interesting sign. That means we’re still taking people off the sidelines and absorbing labor.
The interesting thing about this cycle is it’s gone on for so long, that people keep coming off the sideline without really producing inflation. So it allows the Fed to let things run. And I think one of the lessons that the Fed has learned and markets are slowly learning is that it’s harder to reduce inflation than used to be thought. Aaron, you remember back in the day, we talked about things. The Fed would even think about lowering interest rates, and much less expanding the balance sheet and people were really, really afraid of inflation.
MD: I think, they are coming to understand, indigenous money, something we’ve talked about for a long time, and that credit creation doesn’t really come from the Fed, per se. And inflation works in a different way from how we were taught. So the Fed I think, is just going to let this thing run. The economy is solid, it’s a 2% economy plus or minus, and through little fiscal stimulus, it goes higher. Then and we get a soft patch and we go lower, and I think it will continue and the disaster or the fear of another crisis is kind of keeping the animal spirits in check from getting too far out over their skis, both in the financial economy and in the real economy. So I think the Fed is going to — until they see price pressures, they’re going to stay I suspect on hold.
AT: So for the record, Charlie Blow [ph] of The Wall Street Journal tweeting out, it’s 110 consecutive months nine plus years of job growth.
MD: There we go.
AT: By far the longest streak in history. So the Fed wasn’t expected to do anything in its meeting this week. Now the spin I’m hearing is that because Jay Paul has sort of said, hey, they’re going to be very cautious about raising rates, again, that we’re in a Goldilocks kind of scenario here. I mean obviously, the financial markets have had a great run, do you literally or figuratively buy into that point of view?
MD: I do. I do. I mean, Goldilocks, in a sense that nothing bad is likely to happen. Growth might not be great guns, investment is probably going to stay punk, as we’ve seen, and wages will grow but not spectacularly. So we’ll kind of chug along and that’s really good. It doesn’t mean that asset prices are going to go kind of straight up to the moon and reflecting a rapid rate of growth. But that kind of city environment is good. You put coupons, and things kind of grind their way higher, and it’s actually the myth I’d like to put to bed quickly though, is that this is about fed liquidity.
So the Fed cut rates a couple few times. And then they’ve added to their balance sheet to deal with the repo issue, which we’ll talk about later, if you like. And people are saying oh, it’s still liquidity that’s driving it, but it’s not really the case. Because if you look at when the Fed started raising rates, and started the process of QT, you know, reducing the balance sheet, it was December 2015. And from that point, until when the Fed started cutting rates before they started re-expanding the balance sheet and all S&P was up 50%.
AT: But we had a tax cut in the middle of that though, right? Wouldn’t that explain it?
MD: Well, it didn’t, in 2015
AT: That was in 2017.
MD: That wasn’t an issue because people weren’t expecting Trump to win, right? So it’s more than that. If you look at the earnings, any chart of earnings, you see that the earnings are growing too. It’s not some kind of false thing. Now it’s true that tax cuts reduced corporate returns to some degree and for sure, reduced animal spirits for a while. But look at the growth we got out of it, right. We got a temporary blip and possibly the tax cuts, we got a sentiment blip from the tax cuts. But the real driver of the short term burst in growth was the big deficit spending package that was on top of, right?
About two months after — and this kind of flew below the radar, because there was such a big fight over and so much back and forth about the tax cuts, that no one noticed that two months later, they passed a spending package. A deficit spending package that scored out by OMB to be larger than the tax cuts, right? And that drove growth for — and we see it, we saw the lump in growth where all of a sudden, the 3%, 4% growth, the 5% growth that Larry Cuttlers [ph] of the world we’re dreaming of was there and they said they see it’s the tax cuts and then all of a sudden that fell off. And really what that was the fiscal stimulus rolling off.
We have some more coming online in the next couple of years, that should help but it was really about that. So we got bigger point and we got a nice little burst and now we fail — we are going back to our natural growth rate of 2% or so. But the important point is that all the guys that are saying, well, it’s just all fed, and it’s all liquidity. If you were to look mechanistically, at what was happening to liquidity in 2015, until July of this year, when the Fed started cutting again, you’ll see it, it wasn’t about that, in my experience and that we been watching it for long time.
The guys that say, they’re really saying, if not for the Fed, my macro [indiscernible] story, the disaster in the Western world would have all come true. These guys are — they’re still trying to get some kind of stick save for their bearish scenario and say, I would have been right if the Fed hadn’t done these irresponsible things.
SA: I wonder how much of this now the Fed, maybe sitting on its hands going forward, but I wonder how much this is a global phenomenon as why the Fed sits on its hands globally, central banks are bailing like crazy.
MD: You hear that a lot, Stephen that the people say. Well, yeah that’s because these other — the central banks have been printing money so to speak. But if you look at those stock markets haven’t gone up. So unless you believe that they print money and somehow it flows into only the U.S. stock market, it just doesn’t really hold water. The other thing is most people don’t understand the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. They think that governments are injecting this money into the stock market. However the money is fungible and finds its way in.
To some degree in Japan, they are buying ETFs and kind of think stock indices that they’re doing but we certainly aren’t. The Europeans are buying some credit, but they’re certainly not buying stocks. But the way the reserve system works is that money’s not fungible, it’s stuck there. You and I, we can’t hold reserves. The only people that can hold reserves are commercial banks. So that money is stuck there. It’s not fungible. There are knock on effects by lowering interest rates and their psychological effects because people think that, that money is coming into the system, but it really doesn’t come directly into the system. The money in the Fed Funds system is for settlement purposes and they can get that [ph] money out.
AT: Might be transmitted by folks say, borrowing at microscopic interest rates overseas and buying Apple yielding 3%?
MD: It could be but you know, you think they’re buying it, in the homes as well, right? It just doesn’t. And if you look at the credit creation in Europe and economic activity, that money is not really being created at that rate, right. So that lending activity is not going on. And in my experience, and I’ve talked about this many times in the past, it’s — low interest rates are not the explanatory variable that people make them out to be. We all remember the dotcom bubble, right? Well, what was the policy rate then? 6%?
AT: Much higher. Yeah, the ten-year [Multiple Speakers].
MD: Right so it’s really typically what — what explains risk taking more than the price of money within reason, obviously, if it’s 10%, or you know, a 12% it matters, but the difference between five and one is a lot less than people think because you see this in all the behavioral finance literature. The two determinants of whether or not people want to take risk are, are they comfortable in their jobs? And are they comfortable in their situation, right, whether they are portfolio managers or workers. And do they see people around them making money.
Those two things much more than the level of the interest rate drive risk taking. And we saw that in the dotcom bubble. And we also saw that in 2005, 2006, 2007, which were the peak years of the lending into the crisis, right? The housing bubble, the peak years were 2005, 2006, 2007 what were policy rates at that point, 5%, right? And afterwards, you fast forward until 2010, when policy rates were zero in 2011 and there was no lending whatsoever.
So obviously, something else matters much more than the price of money to lending. So I’m not a big buyer of the notion of, though it’s the low interest rates in Europe, we’re driving somehow the price of Apple. The earnings are there for these guys. Yeah, multiples expand and contract, but they haven’t gone crazy. So I just don’t buy that notion. It’s convenient, because people say, liquidity or monetary policy, right, but it’s an easy answer, but it’s not the right one.
AT: Strong economy, a strong consumer good for stock prices?
MD: I think strong is more solid, 2% growth is not strong. So one of the things that we’ve discovered after the global financial crisis is that our natural speed of growth is slower than what it used to be. And there are a lot of reasons for that I’ve written, I wrote about it eight years ago, right? Demographics have changed, we used to have a credit tailwind, now we have a credit headwind, there are all kinds of reasons. But I wouldn’t call it strong, I call it solid. We had a sub-par recovery. And now we have a sub-par rate of growth, at least for guys old enough to remember the pre-crisis days.
SA: So we’re going to get into some specific trading ideas in a minute here. But before we do that, you’ve done I think, a great job in the last 10 years of what you just did here, of explaining to people why most people that certainly the perma bears had been wrong about the Fed and the effects that the transition mechanism of monetary policy.
So I’m going to give you a chance right now to address something you referenced a few minutes ago, which is the thing they’re hanging their hats on right now, which is what’s going on in the repo market. And you know, whether it’s QE or not QE, you know, the feds pumping money like mad to keep the plumbing open and the operations flowing. And if not for them, the whole system would be collapsing again here. Maybe that’s an exaggeration. But again, there’s not a lot for the bears to hang their hat on right now. But what is your take on what’s happening in the repo market?
MD: So I wrote a piece recently, there was a lot of back and forth on Twitter when it first happened. And then I decided, because the issue was kind of persisting, even though it faded in intensity. I suspected it was going to resurface at the end of the year, because of that normal balance sheet pressures. I wrote a little piece, just kind of like the simple man’s take on repo, and it’s on the blog.
The bottom line on it is that there are a lot of structural changes in the — first of all, it’s not QE, right? And the easy way to look at it is they’re not trying to lower the interest rates. What they’re doing is they’re trying to maintain the current interest rate in the target band, because there’s a shortage of reserves relative to what people need for settlement purposes. Why is that so? Well, it’s not so much as a shortage of reserves as a shortage of desired results. People are hoarding them, they are holding more reserves than they need for a few particular reasons. One of them is there was a structural change in 2008 that led to the treasury holding its balances at the Fed instead of in the commercial banking system.
So all of a sudden, the treasury deposits are part of the Federal Reserve’s. So when they issue debt, or when they spend their account fluctuates significantly, right? They make payments to other banks, they take payments to the banks. Now remember, in the Fed Funds system, banks can only pay each other right? The treasury can only pay banks and banks can pay treasuries, but it’s a closed deal. So when the treasury builds its balances, right it’s a general account and the TGA, the Treasury general account, it by definition is taking reserves from the rest of the system.
Right, so the volatility that’s induced by the treasury expanding and contracting its account there because it spends money and raises and sells debt, has led to banks hoarding. They say, well we don’t know there’s going to be much more volatility for demand, we want to make sure that we have a nice cushion, right? Now that’s one of the things. Another reason is that in the wake of the GFC, banks want to hold more precautionary reserves and they’re expected to hold more, the regulatory requirements are higher, and the expectations from the regulators are also high, right? So they have to hold more for that reason.
Another thing is that banks for liquidity purposes can hold either treasuries or reserves. Those are the two instruments that count towards their high quality liquid asset requirements. That HQ LA as you will often see it referred on Twitter. So but they’re not exactly the same, you know, Stephen, you can hold a treasury, I can hold a treasury, Aaron can hold a treasury but we can’t hold reserves. So the fungibility is a little bit different in these two assets.
The other thing that’s different, that’s important, really important in this context, is that reserve can be exchanged and they settle immediately, right? I can give them to you, JPMorgan settles with Bank of America and it just settles immediately, whereas we sell treasuries to somebody if you can agree to settle T plus zero same day settlement and then it settles in the little settlement window at the end of the day. But typically it settles at T plus one. So you don’t get the money immediately.
So if there’s some kind of crunch in the system and you need money right now, you need reserves right now, you have to have reserves, you can’t just raise them that easily by selling and repoing out your treasuries. So that is all these things that kind of created a large a preference for holding reserves. And then there are more complicated, second order issues as to why this is happening.
AT: So, right, so before we get to that, I mean, I’m just going to note that was you know about three minutes of a quote, simple explanation. And I appreciate that, from your point of view as a former IMF and Treasury economist that is simple, but just, yes or no, should I be worried about this?
MD: No, sure. So, basically what’s happened is that the need for reserves has gone up for these regulatory reasons and some precautionary reasons. We’re in a different world now. And because people are so scarred by what happened last time, they do not absolutely want to be caught, having to go to the central bank window and to borrow money. So they’re holding on a precautionary basis, much more than they need to hold. And what they need to hold has also increased for regulatory reasons. That’s the bottom line.
So now what has to happen is the Fed has to work with them to say, okay, what can we do in the regulatory environment to ease things up a little bit. Maybe the rules that we set after the GFC were too strict, right? And we can loosen them up so that everything can flow a little bit better. So the reserves are there. They just need to get them to flow a little bit better.
AT: All right, we are talking with Mark Dow of Behavioral Macro. We’ll be right back with more.
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AT: So we’re back with Mark Dow, author of the Behavioral Macro blog and a related twitter feed at behavioral Macro. And you just heard Mark give a great explanation of what’s going on in the repo market. Again he’s a former staff economist at the IMF and Treasury, who then went to the buy side, which is not the typical journey. So how do you synthesize all that sort of economics and macro knowledge that you have into trading where they often don’t match up? As we’ve certainly seen the last 10 years people have gotten, you know, the macro story, right and botched the trade and vice versa. How do you —
MD: I got lucky, I learned early on, I sat with some guys — when I came out of the IMF, I was a sovereign analyst rights for emerging markets. But I sat around a lot of guys in mutual fund industry that were making money, and I saw wow, they don’t really understand anything about economics when you talk to them. But they make money, how is that so. And I started doing a little research. And back then there wasn’t a whole lot of behavioral finance. I studied technical analysis, I studied risk management, techniques all kinds of things. And then the behavioral literature as it started to come out.
And I kind of pieced together that, the much more important thing was managing risk was figuring out the psychology of the market at a particular point in time and what narratives might stick. Then the next step we’re seeing whether or not that aligns up with your fundamental view, right? But the risk management is key, and figuring out narratives and what drives them is right behind that.
So I learned to take my columnist hat and put it on the hat rack for most of the time, and then, selectively take it off and use it. And those were always kind of the best trades but often infrequent. So that was really it. I learned that they’re kind of separate skills, and you needed both. And that economist got killed because they said well, if I like it at 50 I have to like it at 20. And then all of a sudden they’re wrong, right? Even if it’s only one out of 10, they’re wiped out and they don’t get the play anymore.
So discipline trump’s conviction kind of thing that you hear a lot from traders. So that got me going. And I worked at a macro hedge fund for seven years, Pharaoh [ph] in New York, where I really learned how to trade, particularly options and emerging market currencies and kind of exotic fixed income instruments. And I learned a lot about trading from that. In particular, I rely on patterns.
So I look for chart patterns that suggest a particular behavior might be coming. And I think what kind of narrative would correspond to this and our investors off sides right now. And I try and put all these things together. And then I say, okay, do I believe the story that might be happening right now, or do I not? And if I believe it, then I bet bigger if I don’t believe it, I might still bad but I’ll bet smaller.
So those are the things I tend to put together. I do pattern recognition, and I set up my risk management around them. I try and figure out what kind of narratives might emerge that are consistent with this. And assess the credibility, the possibility of these narratives. And then I asked myself whether or not I believe in those narratives fundamentally.
AT: So let’s drill down to the outlook for next year, as it pertains to short term interest rates. Were sitting here this morning 266,000 jobs created in November and employment rate is 3.5%. And I’m looking at the euro dollar strip at the CMA. And there’s no hint of a sign that the Fed is going to be hiking and actually the December 2020 contract is roughly 25 basis points lower than in December 2019 contract, suggesting the next move is an ease. Is there a disconnect there?
MD: No, not at all. I actually think that what you’ve seen priced in at the end of next year is really a rounding error. So it’s almost as if nothing is priced in for next year. There’s a slight presumption maybe to the downside, just because people think the bar is high, as I was saying earlier for the Fed to hike. They need to see some inflation first. So I think that’s about right. I think the story is the Fed is going to stay mostly on hold until the data approve otherwise. I think they’ve been pragmatic, I think there was a misunderstanding at the end of 2018 that was most of the markets doing, but we often overreact to the Fed. And those things tend to can often feed on themselves.
We happen to have QT happening at the same time. And a lot of people were convinced that QT was going to — because they misunderstood how liquidity worked, was going to drag down the stock. I mean, people thought that that mechanistically QT was dragging down the stock market in December of 2018. And of course, the market would never have rebounded, if that had been the case, because the Fed didn’t address the repo problem until a couple of months ago.
I’m pretty relaxed about the Fed. I think they’ll stay there in the background unless something dramatic happens some exogenous shock that we can’t foresee right now.
AT: So before earlier, I sort of flippantly asked you about Goldilocks and you pretty much agreed we might be there. So how are you positioned right now? Is it already you know, is 2020 too far away? Like how short term are you trading?
MD: So I have two different styles that I trade in. One is a trading style and the other’s an investment style. And the trading style is leveraged, aggressive and doesn’t have a long time rise. And so little bit like what Renaissance macro does except they do with machines, right? And I’m sure they’re better at it. But I look for patterns that I think will revert or patterns that will break out or certain things that I’ve seen in the past. And when I think they’re emerging, I take highly levered bets. And if it’s really, really levered, obviously, I’m not going to be able to hold on to it for that long. It’s got to work and work immediately, and then I’ll ride it until I think it’s over. And I think that phenomenon has chances of going further. I’ll cut the size of my position so that I can ride it longer, right? That’s kind of how I do the trading.
On the investment side, I take a lot longer term view. I have a little bit of a kind of a short term overlay. But mostly I think we’re in a good space. I think we haven’t mentioned this before, but I do think there’s an asset shortage both in what they call risk free or high quality assets like treasuries and government bonds, and even in stocks. So and this is really going to– I mean, if you think the perma bears are mad now that they’ve been wrong because of the macro call, when all of sudden valuations go higher because there’s just not enough stocks out there. And a lot of people need to invest their savings, and they’re really going to get mad.
AT: Can you talk about any specific positions you have now? I know you’re managing —
MD: No, not really. I don’t want to get in specifically, and I don’t have any particular themes. You just want to be long. It depends on how if you don’t want to manage it day to day, a diversified portfolio, you just get long indices and let it ride. I just don’t see the cycle ending soon. I mean, that’s certainly not the base case. People keep trying to play reversion in oil, and maybe we’ll get one at some point. But it’s kind of hard to think you have to — it matters less about what you stay long with, unless you have really highly concentrated positions, you know, just it’s more important is to participate. That’s really it.
I’m not a huge buyer of this go abroad right now. Yeah, I think that might work. I do think that the global economy is going to slowly muddle — you know, recover in terms of expectations. I think people got too pessimistic a few months ago. And now that pessimism is unwinding, but I don’t see any great guns. China is going to continue to slow its natural rate of growth. And I wrote about this back in 2012.
All of this is happening, and that’s going to continue. And emerging markets are going to muddle through. There is a fair amount of financialization that we haven’t talked about for the past 30 years. Before the financial crisis we had massive financialization all around the world. That means what we call financial deepening.
So Brazil 20 years ago didn’t have insurance companies or asset managers right, now they do. And that’s happening all over the world. We, here in the U.S., we weren’t nearly as financialized 20 years ago, as we are now. People 30 years ago or so people didn’t have as many credit cards, they didn’t have as many mortgages because rates were higher. And a lot of the products that we use today weren’t invented yet. And I love the technology. So all of that has created a little bit, I’m going to call it debt overhang, that it just weighs on growth. I suspect, so I don’t expect great guns in terms of growth around the world or anything like that. So I think staying in the U.S. is fine. There may be opportunities periodically abroad, but you just kind of want to stay long.
AT: So you brought up — you brought up China’s and I was interested. There’s obviously a trade war stuff is coming on a daily basis. Do you just use — every time the market goes down a few ticks, when some bad news comes out are you just using that as an opportunity to buy?
MD: It depends on how I’m positioned going into it, really. So I mean what we’ve seen on the trade war stuff is when good news comes out, the market goes up. And when bad news comes out, it doesn’t go down as much and doesn’t stay very long. So to me, that’s saying one of two things, or maybe a little bit of both, that there is this asset shortage, and guys just need to get exposure, right.
But two that the trade war isn’t as big of a deal as people are making it out to be for the stocks themselves. And I think that’s the case because if you look at exports and imports are not a huge share of our GDP. There’s a lot of sentiment surrounding it and the whole story about the globalization in the longer term is real, it matters. But I just don’t think the tariff issue in the trade war, so to speak, is as big of a deal to the real economy. And to the underlying stocks as people make it out to be.
AT: That’s going to be very interesting to see how that plays out. And it’s been, Mark, it’s been great having you on. I really appreciate all the insights. Before we let you go, I do want to ask you about Bitcoin. You’ve gotten some notoriety, probably more than you might have want in last couple years for your calls on Bitcoin, which directionally both short and long have been correct. You wrote that historically, Bitcoin has been the most pattern perfect asset I can remember seeing, both on the way up and on the way down. So what is the pattern of Bitcoin telling you right now?
MD: That it’s dying.
AT: It’s dying?
MD: It’s having a glut year. So the way I look at it is we had a big spike of enthusiasm starting around Thanksgiving 2017 and peaking around mid-December 2017. And then we — it went from 19,000 something all the way down to 3,500. And now its bounced back, but it had kind of an echo bubble earlier this year, where it got up above 10,000. And even briefly a little higher, and it’s come off, and it’s come significantly off of that. Typically strong assets, bull market assets, secularly growing assets, don’t make a significant lower high, right. And that’s true for most. It doesn’t mean that’s always true. But it very strongly tends to be true. And if you think that the asset adheres to technical patterns better than any asset you’ve ever seen, that’s what you’re going to go with.
Now right, that’s going to be your presumption. So that’s my presumption. There’s not as much interest in it either. You just don’t — if you do a Google search of the term, you’ll find that the frequency is declining. It’s had 10 years for broader adoption that hasn’t been happening. So you know, there’s lot of guys talk about it. I just don’t see it, really taking off and I’ve never really been much of a believer in it because the ease of use was never there and the stability of value was never there to get the broader acceptance that you needed.
AT: It’s unregulated.
MD: And to get around those things, you have to violate some of the elements that make Bitcoin attractive in and of itself, you know that it’s not, they have set terms for these that I forget. But they said, you know, it can’t be falsified, governments can’t screw with it. And it can be secret and it can’t be tampered with. It’s unregulated. We will going to talk about that in a second. But the properties that make Bitcoin attractive are also the properties that are keeping it from being less volatile, and keeping it from being more broadly adapted.
AT: So interesting, so your comment about Bitcoin initially, I take it as that’s a comment as a trader on the asset class. But it also sounds like saying, you’re fairly, I’ll say, bearish on the whole concept, right of crypto-currencies. Is that what I’m hearing?
MD: Yeah, I’ve been skeptical the whole time. I just don’t see the use case. So the core guys who believe in Bitcoin, basically say, the rest of the world shares my paranoia about governments and sooner or later, they’re going to realize it, but I just don’t think the rest of the world needs the security that, that group does, right. It’s — Gold and Bitcoin are the paranoid assets, the people who have that personality tend to gravitate towards them, they just don’t trust. And they’re kind of assuming everybody else is like them.
They just haven’t figured it out yet. And I just don’t think that they’re right, that I think they’re projecting onto other people, how they view the world. And I think more people care about ease of use. I mean, we’ve seen this in the whole software world with privacy issues. People always complain about privacy, but they never really do anything about it. They kind of accept it, right?
I think it’s the same kind of thing with Bitcoin. Yeah, it would be nice to have these features, but am I going to go through the hassle of, going through these elaborate hoops to use it, and see as volatility go up and down, if I want to buy something. I might have to spend more or less. So it doesn’t seem that circle doesn’t square for me. And but that’s how I think fundamentally, I traded based on patterns. But the pattern the significant lower high that we saw earlier this year, suggests to me that was an echo bubble, and it’s a dying asset. And my base case is that it’s going to have a slow grinding death punctuated by spikes and spoofs with FOMO attached to people all here comes again.
Now I don’t want to miss it. I’m going to jump in decreasing frequency and decreasing intensity, right? So we’re going to see them and every once in a while and they’ll fade away.
AT: All right, well, on that happy note, we don’t want to fade away but we do have to go now. Mark thank you so much for being with us today. Our guest has been Mark Dow the author of Behavioral Macro. @Behavioral Macro is his Twitter feed. You got to check it out, Mark. It’s great to have you. Thank you.
MD: Thanks, guys. Thanks again for having me.